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This paper aims to analyse the influence of risk information disclosure on the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts for the 
Spanish stock market. To do this, we performed a regression analysis with panel data on a sample comprised of non-financial firms listed 
on the Madrid Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2015. The results of the study show that risk information disclosed by firms does not help to 
reduce analysts’ uncertainty levels nor enable them to make more accurate forecasts of future profits. Furthermore, separately testing 
verified and unverified risk information disclosure confirms that there is no relationship between the risk information disclosed and the 
perception that analysts have on companies’ levels of risk. 
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Divulgación de información sobre riesgos y su impacto en la precisión de las previsiones de los analistas 
Resumen
Este trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar la influencia de la divulgación de información de riesgo en la precisión de las previsiones de 
beneficios de los analistas financieros para el mercado de valores español. Para ello, se ha realizado un análisis de regresión con datos 
de panel para una muestra de empresas no financieras que cotizan en la Bolsa de Madrid de 2010 a 2015. Los resultados muestran que 
la información de riesgo no ayuda a reducir los niveles de incertidumbre de los analistas. Adicionalmente, el análisis por separado de la 
información de riesgos verificada y no verificada confirma que no existe relación entre la información de riesgos publicada y la percepción 
que los analistas tienen sobre los niveles de riesgo de las empresas.
Palabras clave: información sobre riesgos; precisión de los analistas; riesgo.
Divulgação de informações de risco e seu impacto na precisão das previsões dos analistas
Resumo
Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar a influência da divulgação de informações de risco na precisão das previsões de lucro de analistas 
financeiros para o mercado de ações espanhol. Para isso, foi realizada uma análise de regressão com dados em painel de uma amostra de 
empresas não financeiras listadas na Bolsa de Madri de 2010 a 2015. Os resultados mostram que as informações de risco não ajudam a 
reduzir os níveis de incerteza de analistas. Além disso, a análise separada das informações de risco verificadas e não verificadas confirma 
que não há relação entre as informações de risco publicadas e a percepção dos analistas sobre os níveis de risco das empresas.
Palavras-chave: informação de risco; precisão dos analistas; risco. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the accounting regulator’s main concerns is that 
financial statements provide useful information for users in 
their decision-making process. The amount of information 
included in financial statements has increased over the years 
in an attempt to meet the information needs expressed by 
accounting bodies and the accounting literature, with the aim 
of improving their usefulness for the different stakeholders 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants - AICPA, 
1987; AICPA, 1994; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Francis & Schipper, 
1999). It has been argued that risk is one of the main 
areas where information is lacking (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW), 1997; Solomon, 
Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2000; Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). 
Various accounting bodies have considered this lack of risk 
information and have consequently issued rules governing 
the presentation of this type of information in financial 
statements.
The issuance of disclosure regulations has opened up an 
interesting line of research into the utility of this information 
for different users, specifically; investors, those who prepare 
the information, and analysts. Two different approaches 
have been used to analyse utility: a direct approach, asking 
users about the usefulness of risk information (Abraham, 
Marston, & Darby, 2012; Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA), 2014; Sarens & D’Onza, 2017); and 
an indirect approach, based on observing capital market 
reactions through analysis of the behaviour of certain market 
variables, such as price, trading volume, yield and spread 
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Kravet & 
Muslu, 2013; Hope, Hu, & Lu, 2016; Miihkinen, 2013; Nelson 
& Rupar, 2015; Filzen, 2015; Jorion, 2002). These studies 
report contradictory results. In general terms with the direct 
approach, authors have called into question the utility of risk 
information for various reasons: information is too generic, 
repetitive and difficult to verify (ICAEW, 2011; ACCA, 2014). 
With the indirect approach, however, results generally show 
that the capital market appreciates risk information, al- 
though some studies report results that contradict the 
theoretical assumptions (Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et 
al., 2014).
Most of the studies related to the risk information 
disclosure analyse its usefulness for a specific group of stake-
holders i.e. investors. However, there are a few studies that 
have focused on the usefulness of this disclosure for other 
stakeholders such as financial analysts. Among these studies, 
the works of Abraham et al. (2012) and Sarens and D’Onza 
(2017) are relevant. These authors asked financial analysts 
about the usefulness of the risk information disclosed. Their 
results show a disparity of opinions among analysts; whilst 
one group perceives this information as irrelevant because 
it is too generic and repetitive, another group considers 
disclosed risk information useful. In the same vein, Kravet 
and Muslu (2013) have shown that the greater the disclosure 
of risk information, the greater the dispersion in analysts’ 
profit forecasts around the date of publication of financial 
statements. Nevertheless, the accounting literature, up until 
now, has not tackled how risk information disclosure impacts 
on analysts’ forecasts of future profits. This paper endeavours 
to address this omission through a study of Spanish firms.
The present paper uses the indirect approach to study 
the hitherto unexamined impact of risk information on the 
accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. It must be 
remembered that financial analysts use both public and pri-
vate sources of information to evaluate firms’ performance 
and make earnings forecasts (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Francis 
& Schipper, 1991). The data in financial statements is an 
important source of information (Ramnath, Rock, & Shane, 
2008). In theory, more comprehensive detail on risks should 
reduce uncertainty for users (including analysts) regarding 
future cash flow and earnings, improving the quality of their 
forecasts and thus having a positive impact on accuracy. 
This empirical study is based on a sample of firms trad-
ing on the Spanish capital market with data for the period 
between 2010 and 2015. The impact of risk information on 
analyst forecasts was determined by running a regression 
analysis with panel data. The models use analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors as the dependent variable and disclosed 
risk information as the independent variable. The degree of 
disclosed risk information was quantified using the index 
proposed by Cabedo and Tirado (2009). These authors built a 
risk disclosure index based on the content rather than on the 
amount of information disclosed (the technique used in most 
studies involves taking the number of key phrases or words 
as an indicator of the amount of disclosed risk information). 
Control variables have also been introduced which, accord-
ing to the literature, affect the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (size, leverage, analyst divergence, audit firm, 
analyst monitoring, earnings quality, profit variability and 
yield volatility). The results show that risk information taken 
as a whole is not related to the accuracy of analyst earnings 
forecasts. 
In addition to the above analysis, this study examines the 
relationship between verifiable disclosed risk information 
and earnings forecast accuracy (analyst earnings forecast 
error). Thus, based on the literature review, the structure 
of the present study is two-fold. Firstly, disclosed risk infor-
mation was divided into three components; risk factors, man-
agement of (verifiable) risks, and quantitative information on 
the impact of (non verifiable) risks. The relationship of each 
of the above components to earnings forecast accuracy was 
then analysed. When risk information was taken as a whole, 
no statistically significant relationship was detected between 
any of these three components and analysts’ profit forecast 
accuracy. Secondly, published risk information was divided 
into two categories; verified and unverified. Analysis of the 
relationship between each of these components and fore-
cast accuracy confirms that there is no statistically significant 
relationship. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section two 
reviews the existing literature and proposes the hypotheses 
for testing. The third section presents the methodology used 
to test the hypotheses, describes the sample and presents 
the data. The results of the empirical study are shown in 
section four. The paper ends with a presentation of the main 
conclusions from the study. 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Scholars have paid particular attention to studying the 
factors that influence earnings forecast accuracy. It has 
been shown that firm size (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), analyst 
monitoring of the firm (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Bozzolan, 
Trombetta, & Beretta, 2009; Ding, Luo, Hao, & Zhang, 2017), 
changes in earnings (Duru & Reeb, 2002), yield volatility (Jaggi 
& Jain, 1998; Duru & Reeb, 2002), international diversifica- 
tion (Duru & Reeb, 2002) and the quality of accounting 
information (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Barron, Kile, & O'Keefe, 
1999; Hope, 2003; Horton, Serafeim, & Serafeim, 2013; 
Glaum, Baetge, Grothe, & Oberdörster, 2013) are important 
factors with an impact on the accuracy of analyst earnings 
forecasts.
Analysts point to the quality of financial statements as 
an important factor when assessing the usefulness of this 
information (Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). Thus, high-
quality accounting information enables analysts to make 
more realistic forecasts with smaller deviations between 
their forecasts and actual events, as Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) and Glaum et al. (2013) have shown. Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) report that an increase in information 
quality (they use Financial Analysts Federation ratings for US 
firms as a measure of quality), increases analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy. Hope (2003) reaches similar conclusions 
for a sample of firms from 22 countries. Other works have 
analysed the effect of International Accounting Standards 
(IFRS) on earnings forecast accuracy (Glaum et al., 2013; 
Garrido & Sanabria, 2014; Horton et al., 2013; Ashbaugh & 
Pincus, 2001; Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless, & Adhikari, 2008; 
Tan, Wang, & Welker, 2011; Byard, Li, & Yu, 2011). 
Although accounting researchers have focused on the 
impact of certain accounting information on improving 
analyst earnings forecasts (Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, & Robb, 
2003; 2003; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Bernardi & Stark, 2018; Kou 
& Hussain, 2007) there are no papers analysing the influen-
ce of firms’ disclosure of risk information on the accuracy of 
analyst earnings forecasts, with the exception of recent work 
by Lin and Lin (2017).
Authors such as Solomon et al. (2000) and Cabedo 
and Tirado (2004) have emphasised the usefulness of this 
information for user decision making. Consequently, a series 
of theoretical (Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter, 2003; Heinle 
& Smith, 2015; Heinle & Smith, 2017) and empirical works 
(Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, & 
Welker, 2002; Jorion, 2002; Moumen, Othman, & Hussainey, 
2015; Campbell et al., 2014; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Miihkinen, 
2013; Zreik & Louhichi, 2017; Cabedo & Tirado-Beltrán, 2014; 
Filzen, 2015; Hope et al., 2016) have studied the impact of 
risk information on capital markets. These studies show that 
risk information disclosure influences share prices (Campbell 
et al., 2014; Filzen, 2015; Hope et al., 2016), affects investors’ 
perception of risk (Campbell et al., 2014; Kravet & Muslu, 
2013), helps to reduce information asymmetry (Campbell et 
al., 2014; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Miihkinen, 2013) and affects 
the cost of capital (Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter, 2003; Heinle 
& Smith, 2017). 
The results reported in empirical works show that in-
vestors take into account the disclosure of larger amounts 
of risk information and adjust their expectations (Campbell 
et al., 2014; Filzen, 2015; Hope et al., 2016). This implies 
that risk information disclosure has an impact on investors’ 
estimation of future cash flows and profits when evaluating 
firms’ shares. In this vein, if analyst earnings forecasts are 
taken as a proxy for these expectations as Fried and Givoly 
(1982) point out, it seems reasonable to think that if risk in-
formation has significant informative content, it will help to 
reduce uncertainty over cash flows or future earnings and 
will therefore redound to more accurate forecasts. Lin and 
Lin (2017) study how the requirements of Financial Reporting 
Release No. 48 (FRR No. 48) regarding the format firms can 
choose to disclose information on their exposure to market 
risk (tabular, sensitivity analysis and value at risk VaR) affect 
the accuracy of analyst profit forecasts. Lin and Lin (2017) 
show that prediction errors are smaller in firms that use 
VaR and the tabular format than in firms that use sensitivity 
analysis. These results show that information on exposure to 
market risks has an informative content for analysts because 
it enables them to make more accurate profit forecasts. In 
contrast, the study by Abraham et al. (2012) analysing financial 
analysts’ perception of the risk information divulged by firms 
in the UK, shows that one group of the analysts interviewed 
consider that risk information is useful, whereas according 
to another group the information is irrelevant due to it being 
too general and repetitive. Sarens and D’Onza (2017) reached 
similar conclusions in their study of analyst perceptions of 
information disclosed on risk, its management and internal 
control in Belgium and Italy.
One may consider risk information as forward-looking 
information. Aljifri and Hussainey (2007, p.883) note that 
“forward-looking disclosure also involves non-financial in- 
formation such as risks and uncertainties that could 
significantly affect actual results and cause them to differ 
from projected results”. In this vein, several studies have 
discussed the usefulness of forward-looking information 
for financial analysts: Bozzolan et al., (2009), Beretta and 
Bozzolan, (2008) and Vanstraelen et al., (2003) show that the 
greater the amount of forward-looking information provided 
by firms, the higher the accuracy in analysts’ profit forecasts. 
In view of the above arguments, the following hypothesis was 
formulated: 
• Hypothesis 1: firm risk information disclosure is related to 
the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts.
In addition, Crawford and Sobel (1982) point out that, 
on balance, information that cannot be verified has no 
informative content and therefore users do not value it. 
In this regard, Dobler (2008) notes that risk information 
includes aspects which are verifiable (on matters such as 
risk factors and their management) and therefore credible. 
That is, analysts can take them into account (Hutton, Miller, 
& Skinner, 2003; Bozzolan et al., 2009). Other elements, like 
those concerning disclosure of the impact of the risk, are not 
verifiable and so, a priori, they may or may not be credible. 
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The informative content of this type of data depends on the 
degree of credibility (Ng, Tuna, & Verdi, 2013; Mercer, 2004; 
Rogers & Stocken, 2005). Therefore:
• Hypothesis 2: risk information disclosed by firms that is 




The hypotheses presented in the above section were 
tested with the following models. 
                 (1)
                (2)
                (3)
where FEi,t is analyst earnings forecast error per share 
for firm i and year t; RDIi,t is the risk disclosure index of 
firm i in year t; DVRDIit is the disclosure index that collects 
information on the different risk factors for firm i in year t; 
IVRDIit is the index that collects information on the impact 
of various risks for firm i in year t; MVRDIit is the index that 
collects information on the management of the different risks 
for firm i in year t; VRDIi,t is the verified risk disclosure index 
for firm i in year t; NVRDIi,t is the non-verified risk disclosure 
index for firm i in year t; C,i,j,t are the control variables, ϐ 
represents the parameters of the model to be estimated and 
ε are the residuals.
The first model (1) tests hypothesis 1, which studies the 
relationship between risk information disclosure in financial 
statements and the degree of analyst forecast accuracy. 
Models (2) and (3) test hypothesis 2, which analyses the 
relationship between verifiable and verified risk informa- 
tion with analyst earnings forecast accuracy per share. 
We ran a regression analysis with panel data for the mo-
dels’ estimation. As a first step, we computed Haussman’s 
test to determine whether a fixed effects model or a random 
effects model was best suited for the data we were working 
with. Then, in the case of the latter, we estimated the 
parameters through the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM). Otherwise, when a fixed effects model was more 
appropriate, we estimated the parameters through the "wit-
hin estimator" or "within transformation". This returned a 
vector that contained the values in deviation from the indivi-
dual means. When the required hypotheses were fulfilled, 
we were able to estimate the model by using ordinary least 
squares by using these transformed variables.
3.2.  Dependent variable
The present study uses earnings forecast error per share 
(FE) as the dependent variable to be estimated in the three 
models. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996), we measured 
earnings forecast error per share (FE) as the negative 
absolute value of the difference between profits per share 
for firm i in year t (EPSi,t) and the median of analyst profit 
forecasts per share for firm i in year t (FEPSi,t), all divided by 
the price of a share in firm i at the start of year t-1 (Pi,t-1) (4):
      
                 (4)
This magnitude is a measure of analyst forecast accuracy. 
Firms with higher FE values will have a better forecast. Values 
closer to zero imply fewer forecast errors. 
3.3.  Independent variables
The proposed models incorporate information on firm 
risk disclosure as independent variables.
3.3.1.  Disclosure of Risk information (RDI)
The degree of risk information disclosure (RDI) was 
measured using the index from Cabedo and Tirado (2009). 
These authors propose an index based on informative con-
tent rather than on the amount of disclosed key phrases 
and/or words, as an indicator of the degree of risk informa-
tion disclosure. They argue that by measuring the degree 
using (for example) the number of phrases, the assumption 
is that a firm that discloses two phrases regarding a certain 
risk is providing twice the information compared to a firm 
that only uses one phrase for the same risk. In fact, the two 
firms may be informing on the same content, although one 
expresses the information with a “longer narrative”. Based 
on that argument, the authors propose an alternative way of 
measuring the amount of published risk information based 
on disclosure indexes constructed from a series of stages or 
levels1. 
The risk disclosure index proposed by Cabedo and Tirado 
(2009) is built from the following equation (5):
                      RDIi= FRDIi + NFRDIi                             (5)
Where RDIi is the risk information disclosure index for 
firm i; FRDIi is the financial risk information disclosure index 
for firm i; and NFRDIi is the non-financial risk information 
disclosure index for firm i.
The financial (FRDI) and non-financial risk disclosure 
indexes (NFRDI) are calculated according to equations (6) and 
(7) respectively:
                (6)
1 On the various alternatives for measuring information published by firms, see Beattie, 
McInnes, and Fearnley (2004). 
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where rf is the type of financial risk;      is the value of stage 
j of financial risk rf for firm i;      will take a value of 1 if firm 
i is at that stage and 0 if it is not; m is the number of stages.
      (7)
where rNf is the type of non financial risk;        is the value 
of stage j of the non-financial risk rNf for firm i;       will take 
a value of 1 if firm i is at this stage and zero if it is not; and 
fi,h represents the risk factors in the case where a category 
of non-financial risk presents information on more than one 
risk factor; fi,h will take value 1 for each n factor in each non-
financial risk.
The following five stages have been used to build the 
above indices:
• Stage 1: the firm only mentions the risks it is exposed to.
• Stage 2: the firm describes the risk and how it is affected.
• Stage 3: the firm informs on quantitative measurement of 
the impact of the risk
• Stage 4: the firm informs on risk management.
• Stage 5: the firm informs on the type of instruments used 
to mitigate the risk.
Risk information has been classified with the business 
risk model proposed by Arthur Andersen and used by ICAEW 
(1997) to provide a framework for business risk disclosure. 
Authors such as Linsely and Shrives (2006) and Kajuter (2001) 
have used this model to analyse the degree of risk disclosure 
in the UK and Germany respectively. Table A1 in the appendix 
presents the classification used for the types of risks.
The components of this Risk Disclosure Index (RDIi) have 
been used to calculate the indices for the verifiable and non-
verifiable components of risk information and the verified and 
unverified components in that information. 
In the case of verified and unverified components, for 
model (3) a verified risk disclosure index (VRDI) and a non-
verified risk disclosure index (NVRDI) was calculated as 
follows:
VRDI should be calculated by taking risk information from 
annual accounts verified by an audit company. In this case, 
listed Spanish firms must present their consolidated finan-
cial statements in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). In this regard, the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS No. 7) regulates the disclosure of 
information in financial statements on financial instruments, 
the associated risks and policies for managing those 
risks. Thus, risk information that undergoes a verification 
process stems from financial risks. Therefore, verified risk 
information (VRDI) has been measured through the above-
mentioned financial risk disclosure index (FRDI). VRDI has 
been assimilated within FRDI.
As regards unverified information, in the case of Spain, 
Article 262 of the Capital Companies Law (Ley Sociedades 
de Capital, 2010) establishes the obligation to disclose, in 
the management report, information on the main risks and 
uncertainties facing the firm. In addition, the regulations indi-
cate that the management report must include information 
on the objectives and policies for financial risk management, 
including the policy used to cover those risks and inform on 
exposure to price risk, credit risk, liquidity risk and cash flow 
risk. Thus, the management report does not neglect the need 
to inform on non-financial risks but managers are left free 
to inform on the aspects they consider noteworthy. Although 
the information on financial instrument risks is subject to a 
verification process (external audit) on the non-financial risk 
information disclosed in the management report, there is no 
obligation to verify that information as there is for the annual 
accounts. The regulations establish that the content of the 
management report must be in keeping with the annual 
accounts, but there is no requirement to provide verification. 
For that reason, the information on non-financial risks has 
been considered non-verified risk information. Thus the non-
financial risk disclosure index (NFRDI) has been taken as a 
measure of non-verified risk disclosure information). NVRDI 
and NFRDI have been assimilated.
Finally for model (2) verifiable and non-verifiable 
information were distinguished by constructing an index for 
each of the aspects indicated by Dobler (2008): 
The index that measures verifiable aspects concerning 
information on the main risk factors (DVRDIi) was calculated 
according to equation (8):
           (8)
where the variables have the meaning defined in 
expressions (6) and (7). Specifically, subindex j refers to the 
stage. That is,       and        will take a value of 1 if firm i is at 
stage 1 or 2, and zero if it is not.
For the aspect regarding management policies and 
hedging instruments (verifiable) the index MVRDIi is built in 
accordance with equation (9).
              (9)
The significance of the variables is the same as before. 
Therefore,        and         will take a value of 1 if firm i is at stage 
4 or 5 and zero if it is not.
And for the third aspect, measurement of the impact 
of (non-verifiable) risk, index IVRDIi was built according to 
equation (10).
                      (10)
           and        they will take a value of 1 if firm i is at stage 
3 and zero if it is not.
As a first step to devise these indices, a coding of the risk 
information disclosed by firms in their notes to the financial 
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statements and their management reports has been con-
ducted. The information has been coded according to the kind 
of risk (see annex) and the aforementioned stage.
Two technicians coded the information for three months. 
Then, 10% of the coded documents (notes to the financial 
statements and management reports of 35 companies) were 
randomly chosen. This sample was analysed by a researcher 
to assess the consistency between the coding performed by 
both technicians. Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was calculated 
with this aim. The value of this coefficient, 0.96, fits the ‘very 
good consistency’ tranche proposed by Landis and Koch 
(1977).
3.3.2.  Control variables 
The control variables in the models are based on prior 
research. The following control variables have been used 
to control for the impact of factors other than that of risk 
information: 
Size: Measured by the logarithm of market capitalisa- 
tion for company i in year t. Previous studies have found a 
negative relationship between size and forecast error, which 
indicates that analysts achieve greater accuracy with major 
companies (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Brown, 1997; Garrido & 
Sanabria, 2014; Glaum et al., 2013).
Analysts: Measured by the logarithm of the number of 
analysts monitoring the firm. Studies by Duru and Reeb (2002), 
Basu, Hwang, and Jan (1998) show a negative relationship 
between the number of analysts who are monitoring the firm 
and analysts’ earnings forecast errors. These results are 
consistent with the theory that firms more closely monitored 
by analysts require greater analysis, which then generates 
better forecasts.
Yield volatility (DesvROA): Kross, Ro, and Schroeder 
(1990). Kross et al. (1990) and Jaggi and Jain (1998) conclude 
that profit volatility is associated with greater analyst profit 
forecast errors. Volatility has been measured using standard 
deviation of the yield on assets in the last 5 years.
Earnings quality: Adjustments for abnormal accruals 
taken in absolute values are used to measure earnings quali-
ty. The higher the absolute value of adjustments for accrual, 
the lower the quality of the earnings. We have used the 
Jones (1991) model to measure accounting discretionality. 
The residuals of the regression of Jones’ (1991) expectations 
model, as suggested by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) are 
expressed as follows (11):
             (11)
where Accrualsit, represents adjustments for total expec-
ted accruals for year t, calculated directly as the difference 
between the operating result and the operating cash flows 
divided by total assets in t-1; ∆Salesi,t is the annual variation 
in net turnover divided by total assets in t-1 and Ppei,t is the 
amount of tangible fixed assets divided by total assets in t-1.
This is to say that the expected amount of accrual 
adjustments depends both on change in incomes and levels 
of tangible fixed assets. The residual of the model (Quality) 
represents an abnormal component of accruals which is 
used as a proxy for accounting discretionality. The larger this 
component, the lower the quality of the earnings. A positive 
relationship is expected between the degree of accrual 
adjustment and analyst forecast errors, according to studies 
by Ahmed, Nainar and Zhou (2005) and Wu and Wilson (2016).
Leverage (Lev): Measured as the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets. Glaum et al. (2013), Chang, Hooi, and Wee 
(2014) and Bozzolan et al. (2009) postulate a negative 
relationship between the degree of firm leverage and the 
accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. That is, the greater 
the degree of leverage in firms the greater the forecast error.
Big4: Behn, Choi, and Kang (2008) show a positive rela-
tionship between the fact that the company is audited by one 
of the major audit companies (Big4) and analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy. Audit quality is introduced in the model as 
a dummy variable, Big4, which takes the value 1 if the firm is 
audited by an audit company from one the four major audit 
companies, and zero otherwise.
Earnings variability (VarEPS): Duru and Reeb (2002) and 
Hope (2003) show that analyst forecast accuracy is related 
to the magnitude of changes in earnings. Wide variations 
in earnings hinder analyst profit forecasts. For the Spanish 
case, Larran and Rees (1999) conclude that sectors with 
the greatest changes in earnings have the greatest forecast 
errors. Changes in earnings have been measured as the 
variation in the annual earnings growth divided by the price 
of shares at the start of the period.
Loss: Prior research indicates that analysts have diffi-
culties making earnings forecasts when firms make a loss. 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2002) show that forecast errors are 
greater in firms with losses. Hope (2003) also concludes that 
there is a negative, but not significant relationship. Therefore, 
it is expected there will be a negative relationship between 
the variable that represents loss and analyst forecast error. 
Loss is included in the model as a dichotomous variable that 
takes the value 1 when the firm made a loss in the previous 
year and zero otherwise.
Analyst deviation (DivAnalysts): Bamber, Barron, and 
Stober (1997) indicate that analyst dispersion is a proxy for 
uncertainty. A higher degree of uncertainty suggests greater 
difficulty with profit forecasting and therefore a higher 
likelihood of error (Hutton, Lee, & Shu, 2012). In this regard, 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) show a negative relationship with 
analyst forecast accuracy. In this study, the variable has been 
measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of 
profit per share in the I/B/E/S forecast database. 
3.4.  Sample
As shown, the objective of the present study is to analyse 
the influence of risk information disclosed by firms in their 
financial statements on the accuracy of financial analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. To test the hypotheses derived from this 
objective, we used a sample comprised of non-financial firms 
listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange (Spain) from 2010 to 
2015, for which analyst profit forecasts per share are available 
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on the Thomson One database. The initial sample included 
468 observations. However, 117 observations with no available 
data on some control variables were removed. Therefore, the 
final sample contained 351 observations. Table 1 shows a 
breakdown of the number of firms in the sample per year.
The risk information was obtained from consolidated 
financial statements (annual and management reports) 
published on the website of Spain's National Securities 
Exchange Commission (CNMV). Analyst earnings forecasts 
were obtained from I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimation 
System) and earnings per share and control variables from 
Worldscope Database.
4. Empirical results
4.1.  Descriptive statistic
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the set 
of variables used in the analysis. As the table shows, the 
mean of the risk disclosure index (RDI) is 24.46, and the 
mean of the verified risk information index (VRDI) is 17.24, 
whereas the mean of the risk index that collects non-verified 
information (NVRDI) is only 7.22. These data show that firms 
offer greater levels of verified information on risks than non-
verified information, as was expected given that verified 
risk information is compulsory, whereas non-verified risk 
information is voluntary. The mean of analyst forecast errors 
(FE) in absolute values is 13% of the share price. However, it 
should be noted that 75% of the observations show forecast 
errors below 8% with a median of 2%. 
With respect to verifiable information, the mean of the 
disclosure index that collects information on the different risk 
factors (DVRDI) and of the index on management informa- 
tion for the various risks (MVRDI) are 15.3 and 7.8 respectively. 
Companies offer on average a greater level of information on 
the risk factors they are exposed to than on the management 
policies and hedging tools the company uses to mitigate 
them. As regards non-verifiable information, the mean of the 
disclosure index on the impact of the different risks of the com-
pany is 1.7. Note that only 25% of the observations present 
information with a greater impact on both types of risks.
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations between the 
independent variables used in the regressions. The corre-
lations between the independent variables are low for the 
three models. Therefore, there is no sign of multicollineari-
ty problems since, except for the relationship between 
‘Analysts’ and ‘Size’, none of the correlation coefficients 
for independent variables of the three estimated models is 
higher than 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003). We have included ‘Analysts’ 
and ‘Size’ within the models because both are key variables 
to consider when analysing the impact of information 
disclosure on the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Duru & Reeb, 2002 and Bozzolan et al., 2009). 
4.2. The effect of risk information disclosure on the accuracy of 
analyst earnings forecasts. 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the model for 
equation (1) used to test the first hypothesis posited in the 
study. When estimating the model through OLS, we detec-
ted no residual autocorrelation (we performed the Durbin-
Watson test). Nevertheless, the results of White’s test indicate 
that there is heteroskedasticity in the residuals of the models. 
Therefore, we have estimated the model using the Gen- 
eralised Least Squares technique. The number of observa-
tions used, as indicated, is 351 with a multiple R2 of 0.7148. The 
model tests the relationship between earnings forecast error 
(FE) with the degree of risk information disclosure, measured 
using the risk disclosure index (RDI). The coefficient for the 
RDI variable is negative but not significant. This indicates 
that the risk information firms disclose is not related to the 
degree of analyst earnings forecast accuracy. These findings 
are in line with studies by Abraham et al. (2012) and Sarens 
and D’Onza (2017). The sign of the coefficients for the control 
variables is consistent with previous studies. The coefficients 
of the variables Lev, Quality, VarEPS, Loss and DivAnalysts are 
statistically significant and negative. This finding shows that 
a greater level of leverage (Lev), a higher level of accrual 
adjustments (Quality) –which means lower quality in the 
results-, greater variation in profits (VarEPS), the existence 
of negative results (Loss) and a greater divergence between 
analyst expectations (DivAnalysts) are related to lower fore-
cast accuracy. In addition, Size is the only significant variable 
positively related to forecast accuracy.
Table 1. Sample companies per year
 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 Total




Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Min. Max. Mean Percentiles
25 50 75
FE -3.3 0 -0.13 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01
RDI 9 80 24.46 17 21 29
IVRDI 0 6 1.71 1 2 2
DVRDI 5 69 15.3 10 12 18
MVRDI 0 21 7.80 5 7 10
VRDI 6 32 17.24 15 17 20
NVRDI 0 48 7.22 0 4 11
Size 9.62 18.21 13.86 12.44 14.09 15.02
Analysts 0.69 3.76 2.45 1.95 2.56 3.09
Quality 0 0.43 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05
Lev 0 107.59 34.3 19.14 32.99 47.48
VarEPS 0 8.59 0.2 0.01 0.03 0.12
DesvROA 0.09 17.44 3.06 1.18 2.13 3.84
DivAnalysts 0 2.84 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02
Source: own elaboration.
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Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix
Variables RDI Lev Size Analysts Quality VarEPS DesvROA DivAnalysts IVRDI DVRDI MVRDI VRDI NVRDI
RDI 1
Lev 0.069 1
Size 0.275*** -0.143*** 1
Analysts 0.159*** -0.099* 0.828*** 1
Quality -0.087* 0.108** -0.056 -0.011 1
VarEPS -0.014 0.288*** -0.179*** -0.148*** 0.199*** 1
DesvROA -0.097* 0.024 -0.322*** -0.240*** 0.169*** 0.345*** 1
DivAnalysts 0.130** 0.345*** -0.239*** -0.214*** 0.180*** 0.235*** 0.023 1
IVRDI 0.320*** -0.033 0.160*** 0.151*** -0.059 -0.090* -0.005 0.102* 1
DVRDI 0.939*** 0.079 0.224*** 0.096* -0.062 0.059 -0.018 0.136** 0.197*** 1
MVRDI 0.687*** 0.031 0.255*** 0.199*** -0.095* -0.142*** -0.230*** 0.024 0.171*** 0.424*** 1
VRDI 0.632*** 0.128** 0.230*** 0.201*** -0.070 -0.010 -0.121** 0.157*** 0.386*** 0.483*** 0.629*** 1
NVRDI 0.940*** 0.028 0.235*** 0.106** -0.076 -0.012 -0.065 0.090* 0.220*** 0.932*** 0.561*** 0.333*** 1
*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10 
Source: own elaboration.














Chi-sq (Haussman) test 70.41 0.000***
*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10
Source: own elaboration.
4.3.  The effect of disclosing verifiable and verified risk infor-
mation on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
As in model 1, in models 2 and 3 we detected no residual 
autocorrelation (we performed the Durbin-Watson test) but 
we found heteroskedasticity problems (White’s test) in the 
residuals of the models estimated through OLS. Therefore, 
we have also estimated these models using the Generalised 
Least Squares technique for panel data.
The model used to test the informative content of the 
three components (aspects) of the information in relation to 
their verifiability has been collected in equation (2). 
The results of estimating this model (2) are shown in Table 
5. As can be seen from the table, none of the coefficients for 
the factors into which the risk information disclosed by firms 
is broken down are statistically significant. That is, whether 
the information is verifiable or not does not influence forecast 
accuracy. For that reason, it cannot be concluded that 
verifiable information helps to reduce analysts’ uncertainty in 
relation to the prediction of future cash flows to be generated 
by the firm. In this way, in relation to verifiable information, 
the second hypothesis is rejected.
As regards the control variables, both the sign and the 
statistical significance level are similar to those obtained 
with estimation of the model (1). Thus, the interpretation of 
the coefficients for the variables estimated with model (1) is 
directly transferable to those of model (2).
Finally, regarding the distinction between verified and 
non-verified risk information, Table 5 also reflects the result 
of the estimated model (3). According to this table, neither the 
variable corresponding to verified risk information (VRDI) nor 
the one corresponding to the non-verified risk information 
coefficient (NVRI) are statistically significant. With these 
results, hypothesis 2 must be rejected.
With respect to the control variables, identical consi-
derations can be made as for model (2).
5. Conclusions
This paper has analysed the relationship between firm 
risk information disclosure and the accuracy of financial an-
alysts’ profit forecasts. Taking as the population non-financial 
firms listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange, for which this 
type of information (forecasts) is registered, two hypotheses 
have been tested: first, risk information, taken as a whole, 
is related to analysts’ forecast accuracy. Second, verified or 
verifiable information is related to that accuracy.
With data from 2010 to 2015, after estimating three mo-
dels, which include the control variables considered relevant 
in the literature, the conclusion is that the first hypothesis 
must be rejected. That is, greater forecast accuracy cannot 
be associated with greater disclosure of risk information. 
And as regards the second hypothesis, the part concerning 
verifiable information must also be rejected: no statistically 
significant relationship has been detected between the 
amount of verifiable risk information published, and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. The test with verified information provides 
the same result. 
Tirado-Beltrán et al. / Estudios Gerenciales vol. 36, N° 156, 2020, 314-324
322
In short, it cannot be concluded that the risk information 
firms disclose helps analysts to reduce their levels of 
uncertainty and thus make more accurate forecasts of future 
profits. Obviously, as in all empirical studies like this one, the 
results must be understood to be conditioned to the study 
population and time period.
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